Battle of the Heavyweights: In This Corner Environmental Rights and in the Far Corner Free Travel Rights by Dewey, Susan F.
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 1
Number 1 Inaugural Issue Article 10
1-1-1974
Battle of the Heavyweights: In This Corner
Environmental Rights and in the Far Corner Free
Travel Rights
Susan F. Dewey
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Susan F. Dewey, Battle of the Heavyweights: In This Corner Environmental Rights and in the Far Corner Free Travel Rights, 1 Hastings
Const. L.Q. 153 (1974).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol1/iss1/10
BATTLE OF THE HEAVYWEIGHTS: IN THIS
CORNER ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND
IN THE FAR CORNER FREE
TRAVEL RIGHTS
By Susan F. Dewey*
Preface
Recently real estate developers and home owners have filed
a complaint challenging the Santa Barbara water moratorium herein
discussed.1 The issue to be litigated concerns an alleged mandatory
duty to provide water and whether the moratorium denies plaintiffs
equal protection of the laws.2
The Santa Barbara water moratorium is used in this article simply
as a catalyst, bringing the right to free travel and the right to preser-
vation of environment into direct confrontation. The pending litiga-
tion, therefore, will have little effect on the thesis of this article, that
is, the right of a community to affect growth so it might conserve its
environment must one day come to blows with the right to travel as
individual communities' capacities to accomodate new growth reach
their respective saturation points.
Until recently, community growth was the proud hope of every
town. Growth meant progress and progress brought jobs and pros-
perity. American towns have traditionally competed with one another
for new business -and new residents, their assumption being that "big-
ger is better."
Suddenly this assumption has waned and many Americans fear
that population distribution is a growing problem.3
* B.A., 1969, University of California, Santa Barbara; J.D., 1975, University
of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. Pomatto v. Goleta County Water Dist. No. 101404 (Santa Barbara, Cal. Su-
per. CL, filed Oct. 26, 1973).
2. Id. Complaint at 12-16. Additionally, plaintiffs have filed a complaint chal-
lenging the Goleta County Water Dist.'s use of the Goleta Ground Water Basin. Po-
matto v. Goleta County Water Dist., No. 101485 (Santa Barbara, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
Nov. 2, 1973). Complainants argue that the water district has no authority to restrict
use of ground water since true ownership lies with the individual property owners. The
water district has cross complained against plaintiffs' overdrawing the water basin with
their own wells.
3. REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON POPULATION GROWTii AND THE AMERICAN Fu-
TURE 44 (Signet ed. 1972).
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Some state legislatures are instituting studies of the efficacy of
the growth ethic4 and others are searching for population stabilization.5
States that once welcomed growth are now legislating to discourage
it.0
While the citizens of many areas are investigating and discussing
optimizing types of land use planning,' Santa Barbara, California has
reached the end of its presently available resources, as many communi-
ties eventually must, and has abruptly halted growth.
In many ways, the Santa Barbara area is a model community.
The city of Santa Barbara proper is of moderate size, having a rela-
tively stable population of 74,000. Undeveloped building lots in the
city are few. Like many other American communities, particularly
those in California, Santa Barbara is bordered by open space which
in recent years has rapidly filled with new living units. The reasons
for the unusually rapid development of land in the Santa Barbara area
become obvious with one visit. A low mountain range forming its
northern boundary and vast stretches of warm beach to the south pro-
vide an attraction to tourists and would-be residents alike.
Located in arid Southern California, the community suffers from
a fluctuating and often sparse water supply. A series of relatively
dry years can create a potentially severe water shortage. During the
1860's such a condition brought to an end the era of the "Empires
of the Dons." The lush green lands of the Santa Barbara area which,
prior to 1862 had supported millions of cattle, the livelihood of the
California rancheros, turned to dust when two consecutive winters
brought no rain. By 1864, few cattle remained alive and crops lay
withered in the fields.
Santa Barbara presents an ideal focus for a study of appropriate
land use. Every geographical area on this continent has the ability
4. S. 155, Fla. Legis., 1972 Sess. (creating a commission to investigate the im-
pact of population growth); H. 734, Hawaii Legis., 1972 Sess. and H. 1322, Hawaii
Legis., 1972 Sess. (creating a permanent commission on population stabilization, in-
cluding determination of an optimum population distribution within the state).
5. Lamm & Davison, The Legal Control of Population Growth and Distribution
in a Quality Environment: The Land Use Alternatives, 49 DENVER LJ. 1, 3 n.3 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Lamm & Davison].
6. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 681 et seq. (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, §§ 6001 et seq. (Supp. 1972). See also, Lamm & Davison, supra note 5, at
3 n.5.
7. Boulder, Col., in 1971 listed a partial catalogue of techniques available to af-
fect growth rates and, while studying techniques for application in the area, declare
a temporary building moratorium. Fairfax County, Va., strictly controls sewer hookups
to limit population growth while it studies population control methods. Washington
Post, Dec. 20, 1971, § 13, at 1, col. 4. Additional communities 'ahich have instituted
similar studies are listed in YEARBOOK OF AGRicuLTuRE 20 (1972); HousE Am) HomE,
May 1972.
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to support a given population of human beings. With a mushrooming
population, a delicate ecosystem, and a poor water supply, the resi-
dents of Santa Barbara have reached the crucial time when they must
determine the exact population capacity of the area. The time is not
far distant when other communities must make the same determina-
tion. The decisions made in Santa Barbara may serve as a model for
others as their time of ultimate decision approaches."
Growth Limitation
In 1972, the water shortage forced the residents of the Santa Bar-
bara area to choose either to import leased water from the Feather
River Project9 or curtail further growth to avoid a crisis which
would necessitate water rationing during summer months. To -area
residents, appalled and dismayed by the recent influx of newcomers
bringing smog, traffic congestion, and an end to the rural atmosphere
of the community, the solution was clear. The Goleta County Water
District, serving the area where the population was growing the fast-
est, declared a moratorium prohibiting further water permits after De-
cember 7, 1972.10
From the standpoint of the average Santa Barbaran, the morator-
ium may appear fully justified, but to local real estate developers and
to residents of Los Angeles and other metropolitan areas who looked
to Santa Barbara as their future home, the moratorium is unreasonable
and unrealistic. The moratorium gives rise to two important issues:
1) Have the constitutional rights of potential residents been violated?
2) If so, may potential residents, or real estate developers represent-
ing them, obtain injunctive relief to compel the municipality to open
its water system to all who so request? Such an -action would force
the community to locate an additional source of water since present
demands now burden the water system to its capacity. In recent dry
years, water demands have created the danger of an overdrawn condi-
8. "Before water and sewer services may be extended to new housing and other
facilities, most communities require certification that public capacities are adequate .to
supply the services. . . . Suburban and regional shortsightedness has left some towns
with inadequate water supplies and sewage treatment facilities for new residential, com-
mercial, and industrial growth. . . The disruptive conditions which led to recent de-
cisions in Washington, D.C., Cleveland, and New Jersey, prohibiting further hookups
dramatize the need for proper land use planning techniques to assure a predictable rate
and direction of growth and development." F. GRAD, EN VONmENTAL LAW: SOURCES
AND PROBLEMS 8-12 (1971) [hereinafter cited as GRAD].
9. The Feather River Project was instituted to pipe Northern California water
to Central Coastal and Southern California areas. See discussion at note 112 infra.
10. Goleta County Water Dist., Santa Barbara County, Cal., Ordinance 72-2.
(Dec. 7, 1972); supplemented by Goleta County Water Dist., Santa Barbara County,
Cal., Responsible Water Policy Ordinance, May 15, 1973.
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tion whereby the water table is lowered considerably below normal
by drawing more water each year than has entered the table during
the previous year.11
Constitutional Challenge
In dispensing water service to area residents, the Goleta County
Water District serves as an instrument of the county administration.
A municipality has wide discretion in distributing public services, but
it must exercise its discretion reasonably. 2 Failure to fairly and ra-
tionally distribute utility services to all residents can result in a finding
of unconstitutional discrimination through denial of equal protection
against those excluded from use of the services. 3
Where a party alleges denial of equal protection of the laws as
a result of the exercise of discretionary power, as with municipal serv-
ices, the courts traditionally have applied one of two tests: either the
"9rational relation" test or the "compelling interest" test is deemed appro-
priate according to the court's analysis of the particular facts of the
case.
1 4
The United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the equal
protection clause traditionally has required that statutory schemes treat
classes of citizens differently only if the classifications so created are
"rationally related" to the purpose of the statute.15 When the courts
11. A report prepared in February 1969 for the Water District, LEEDs, HILL &
JEwiTr, INC., SURFACE RESoURCES AVAILABLE TO GOLETA COUNTY WATER DIsTICT 26
[hereinafter cited as LEEDS, HILL & JEwrrr], placed the ground water safe yield at
5,000-5,800 acre feet. Added to the Cachuma Project (a county-wide reservoir project
used by five water districts) allocation of 10,300 acre feet, the total available water
for 1969 was between 15,300 and 16,100 acre feet. Demand was at 14,600 acre feet.
In August 1972, the Goleta County Water District Board of Directors arranged to bor-
row from the Santa Barbara County Water Agency between 519 and 1769 acre feet
of water (the actual amount to vary according to rainfall for the year) to cover its
needs for 1972-73. Letter from Goleta County Water Dist. Bd. of Directors to Santa
Barbara County Water Agency, August 17, 1972.
12. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
13. Id. The court found discrimination on the basis of race and declared uncon-
stitutional provision of utility services in middle class white areas which were vastly
superior to services provided poor black areas. Accord, Reid Dev. Corp. v. Parsippany-
Troy Hills Township, 10 N.J. 229, 89 A.2d 667 (1952).
14. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 190-93 (1964); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483,
487-88 (1955). See also, Note, A Question of Balance: Statutory Classifications under
the Equal Protection Clause, 26 STAN. L. REv. 155, 156-57, nn.6-11 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as A Question of Balance].
15. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See also, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); McDonald v. Board of Elec-
tion Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S.
61 (1911); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897).
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apply this "rational relation" test, they grant to the governmental action
in question a general presumption of validity 6 and will not interfere
in the absence of capricious or arbitrary conduct or abuse of discre-
tion.1
7
In Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,' for example, the Su-
preme Court refused to review the judgment of the New York legisla-
ture as to the necessity of passage of a statute which, consistent with
due process of law, prohibited a land owner from pumping gas, oil,
and water on his own land.' 9 The purpose of the statute, protection
of nearby mineral springs, was found to be within the legitimate police
power of the state. 20 The remaining question was whether or not
the statute bore a rational relation to its purpose. The Court placed
great stress on the role of the local government in determining the
rationality of an action, stating:
A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend
against [the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment] merely because it . . . results in some inequality ...
When . . . such a law is called in question, if any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence
of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be
assumed. . . . One who assails . . . such a law must carry the
16. "The presumption of validity attends official action and the burden of proof
to the contrary is upon those who challenge the action." Aero Mayflower Transit Co.
v. Carpentier, 167 F. Supp. 898, 902 (S.D. Il. 1958). Accord, Steel Hill Dev., Inc.
v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972); Tower Realty, Inc. v. East De-
troit, 196 F.2d 710 (6th Cir. 1952); Rochester v. Macauley-Fern Milling Co., 199 N.Y.
207, 92 N.E. 641 (1910). See Confederacion de la Raza Unida v. City of Morgan
Hill, 324 F. Supp. 895 (N.D. Cal. 1971). See also, Note, Local Government-A Mu-
nicipality Has the Power to Regulate by Local Ordinance the Emission of Air Pollu-
tants, 22 SYRACUSE L. Ruv. 1173 (1971).
17. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) stated inter alia that
a presumption of constitutionality is granted a regulation even if some inequality re-
suits unless the classification causing the inequality "rests on grounds wholly irrelevant
to the achievement of the State's objective." In Standard Oil Co. v. Marysville, 279
U.S. 582, 584 (1929), the Court noted "that where legislative action is within the scope
of the police power, fairly debatable questions as to its reasonableness, wisdom and
propriety are not for the determination of courts, but for that of the legislative body
on which rests the duty and responsibility of decision." A state court noted in Samuels
v. Harrison, 195 N.Y.S.2d 882, 885 (Sup. Ct. 1959) that a municipal enactment is
presumed to be supported by facts known to the legislative body and the burden of
proof rests on one who seeks the declaration of unconstitutionality to demonstrate that
the action is unreasonable. When the validity of the action is debatable, the judgment
of the legislative body must control. See also, Jefferson v. Haskney, 406 U.S. 535
(1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); United States v. Carolene Prod.
Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
18. 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
19. Id. at 82.
20. Id. at 77.
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burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis,
but is essentially arbitrary.
21
Only where a complainant can demonstrate the denial of a "fun-
damental right '"22 or creation of a "suspect classification '23 will the
Supreme Court add to the basic requirement of a "rational relation,"
the stipulation that the government show a higher degree of rationality
and a "compelling state interest" to justify the action.
24
Recently the United States Supreme Court has begun a shift away
from the strict dichotomy of the "rational relation" and "compelling
state interest" tests.25 During its 1971 Term, the Court in a signifi-
cant number of cases seemed to approach equal protection cases from
a new angle. In seven of the fifteen "basic' 26 equal protection deci-
sions during the term, the Court upheld the constitutionality claim or
remanded it -for consideration without mention of the "strict scrutiny"
formula.27  After years of adhering to the "rational relation" require-
ment,28 the Court now is intervening in governmental actions and
21. Id. at 78-79.
22. The Court alone determines which interests it will label "fundamental." E.g.,
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) (right to procreate). See generally, A Question of Balance, supra note 14 at
155-56 n.5; Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rnv. 1065
(1969).
23. Suspect classifications are groups which have a special need of protections be-
cause they are "discrete and insular" minorities. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). See generally, Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Pro-
tection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. Rnv. 341, 356-65 (1949).
24. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) wherein the Su-
preme Court stated that an action "which serves to penalize the exercise of [a consti-
tutional] right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental
interest, is unconstitutional"; Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
25. E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1972) (law prohibiting distri-
bution of contraceptives to unmarried persons voided); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76
(1971) (statute giving preference to men over women as estate administrators declared
invalid). But see, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970) (welfare grant
ceiling sustained). Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897). Accord,
F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
26. The term "basic' is applied because these cases fit the following criteria:
1) they were decided after argument and with full opinion; 2) the equal protection
issue was central rather than peripheral on the face of the prevailing opinion; and 3)
the equal protection issue was not within one of the two active areas of equal protec-
tion litigation which have developed their own specialized doctrinal offshoots-racial
discrimination and reapportionment.
27. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971),
28. See text accompanying notes 14-24,
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seems to gauge the reasonableness of questionable means used toward
a governmental end on the basis of evidence before the Court, not
on rationalizations created by judicial hypothesizing."'
Professor Gerald Gunther ° suggests that perhaps the Supreme
Court is moving toward a new model for analysis of all equal protec-
tion cases."' The model he proposes would stress the means used by a
government scheme, not its ends. Thus, the state could achieve a wide
range of objectives. The measure of acceptability of the means would
be the purposes chosen by the legislature, not constitutional interests
subjectively perceived by the justices. Professor Gunther argues that
the strengthened "rationality" scrutiny would curtail the state's choice
of means far less severely than the Warren Court's "strict scrutiny"
which inquired whether the means were necessary and whether less dras-
tic means were available to achieve the statutory purpose. 32 Professor
Gunther prefers the technique focusing on the means used because it
allows the Court to judge the purposes and the methods of a govern-
mental action based on evidence actually before the Court. Ultimate
value judgments of the legitimacy and importance of supposed legisla-
tive purposes thus could be avoided."3
Whatever promise of adherence to a perceptible model the 1971
Term may have shown, the 1972 Term of the Supreme Court effec-
tively dispelled Professor Gunther's hope for a predictable approach
to equal protection issues. In San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez,34 the Court resurrected its former judicial abdication
stance. Rather than stringently applying Professor Gunther's model,
suggested by Mosley,35 (judging rational connection on the basis of
evidence before the Court), the Supreme Court sustained school fi-
nance schemes on a basis which three of the dissenting justices thought
reduced "equal protection analysis [to] no more than an empty ges-
ture."8 6
29. See the discussion of Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61
(1911) supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text; Gunther, The Supreme Court,
1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAv. L. REv. 1, 21 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Gunther].
30. Gunther, supra note 29.
31. Professor Gunther points out that in Chicago Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 95 (1972), the Court tried to formulate a question appropriate to all equal
protection cases: "Is there 'an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by
the differential treatment?'" Id. at 17.
32. Id. at 21.
33. Id. at 21-22, 47-48.
34. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
35. See discussion at note 31 supra.
36. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 68 (1973)
(White, J., dissenting).
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In Roe v. Wade,3 7 the Court mentioned the "compelling state
interest" requirement once again. Extending the right to privacy to
a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy in the first trimester, the
justices stated that invasion of that right through prohibitions of abor-
tion can only be justified by a compelling state interest.38 The Court
in Roe questioned neither the legitimacy of the legislature's goals nor
the rationality of their relation to the challenged statutes, preferring
instead to balance the relative weights of the respective interests in-
volved and concluding that the goals of state abortion prohibitions are
not important enough to sustain the invasion of a woman's privacy.39
During the brief period from 1971 through 1973 the Supreme
Court's approach to equal protection cases has varied markedly, but
two generalizations concerning the issue remain intact:
1) Where traditional "fundamental rights" or "suspect classifi-
cations" are involved, the state must show a compelling interest to
justify interference. The Court will balance the interests involved to
determine which must prevail.40
2) When infringement of other important individual rights is
alleged, the Court will generally apply Gunther's modified "rational
relation" test to the governmental action, reviewing it to determine
whether the means used are appropriate for furthering the legitimate
governmental purpose professed. 1
Determination of which category the Santa Barbara cases best fits
depends on whether or not the water moratorium violates individuals'
fundamental right or rights. The two possibilities are the right to fair
and adequate housing and the right to free travel, including free mi-
gration and settlement.
Right To Adequate Housing
Development of the right to housing as a fundamental constitu-
tional right halted in 1972 when the United States Supreme Court
held in Lindsey v. Normet42 that the right to adequate housing is not
37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
38. Id. at 154-55. Recognizing that the state has a compelling interest to pre-
serve human life, the Court allowed for state interference only at a point when the
unborn fetus becomes viable, i.e. capable of living outside the womb. Id. at 162-63.
39. Id. at 152-53, 164-65.
40. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See discussion of "fundamental rights"
at note 22.
41. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). But see, San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
42. Tenants withheld their rent because the landlord had not remedied certain
substandard conditions. The landlord threatened eviction so the tenants filed a class
action for a declaratory judgment that the Oregon Forcible Entry and Wrongful De-
tainer Statute ORE. PEv. STAT. §5 105.105-160 (1909) was inconstitutional. Applying
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a fundamental right under the Constitution. A municipality need only
show a rational basis to justify an action which infringes on the right.
If proponents of the moratorium convince a court that the action is
rationally related to a specific legitimate governmental interest, that
is, preservation of the existing water supply for the use of those pres-
ently dependent on it and limitation of population density so it con-
forms with environmental strictures, -the right .to housing is not likely
to present serious opposition to the validity of the ordinance.
48
Right To Free Travel
The right to free travel, including migration and settlement, is
well-established in American law, having been first recognized by the
United States Supreme Court in 1849 in the Passenger Cases.44 The
Supreme Court developed the concept more fully in 1867 in Crandall
v. Nevada.45 In this landmark decision, the Court declared that a
state tax placed on stage coaches and railroads, taxing them for each
passenger transported out of the state, was an unconstitutional limit
on the right to travel between states. Considering the right to travel
to the Capitol to petition the government essential to the preservation
of a democracy, the Supreme Court could not tolerate infringement
of the right.46  The right to travel between the states has since been
expanded to include migration and settlement, 47 as well as intrastate
the "rational relation" standard, the Court stated that: "We do not denigrate the im-
portance of decent . . . housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial -reme-
dies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document
any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality. . . . Ab-
sent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing . . . [is a] legislative,
not judicial [function]." 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972). Though the Court discussed ade-
quacy of housing, it is reasonable to infer from its application of the "rational relation"
test that the Court cannot bring itself to declare the right to housing to be on a par
with recognized "fundamental rights" (e.g. right to vote, right to free association, right
to privacy). The Court sustained the Oregon statute which 1) allows a landlord to
bring a suit for eviction within six days after service of complaint unless security for
accruing rent is provided, and 2) limits triable issues to the tenant's default (defenses
relating to the landlord's failure to maintain the premises are precluded). This statute
in essence allows the landlord to evict any tenant after a successful showing in court
that the tenant has not paid rent. Therefore, though the Court directly mentioned "de-
cency" and "adequacy" of housing, inherent in its discussion is the recognition that
the tenant has no "fundamental right" to a roof over his or her head.
43. The California Supreme Court has declared the obligation to pay rent to be
interdependent with the landlord's duty to repair, but the issue was decided from a con-
tract, rather than a constitutional standpoint. Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168,
111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (Cal. 1974).
44. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 282, 491-92 (1849).
45. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
46. Id. at 48-49.
47. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) struck down the requirement of
a one year state residency for obtaining welfare benefits because the Supreme Court
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travel.48
In Truax v. Raich,40 the United States Supreme Court declared
that the right to freedom of travel grew out of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution. The right to travel gained renewed strength
in Edwards v. California,5 wherein the Court held unconstitutional
a California statute passed at the height of the depression, prohibiting
any person from bringing, or assisting in bringing into the state any
non-resident of the state, knowing that person to be indigent. The
Court held that though it recognized the magnitude of the problem
created by the massive influx of migrants into California, there are
boundaries to the permissible area of state legislative activity.
And none is more certain than the prohibition against attempts
on the part of any single State to isolate itself from difficulties
common to all of them by restraining the transportation of persons
and property across its borders. 51
To allow this statute to stand would "withhold from large segments of
our people that mobility which is basic to any guarantee of freedom
of opportunity."" s  In Edwards, the majority based their finding of
unconstitutionality on the commerce clause, but Justice Douglas, joined
by Justices Murphy and Black, stated the right to free travel to be
an implied right, protected by the Constitution and "fundamental to
the national character of our Federal government." A fourth justice,
Justice Jackson, found the basis of the right in the privileges and im-
munities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.54
found that the purpose of the waiting period was to discourage persons from entering
the state who would likely become burdens on the state welfare program. The Court
stated that "the purpose of inhibiting migration by needy persons into the State is con-
stitutionally impermissible. ... mhe nature of our Federal Union and our constitu-
tional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel
throughout.. . our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreason-
ably burden or restrict this movement." Id. at 629. In Cole v. Housing Authority,
312 F. Supp. 692, 702 (D. R.I.), aff'd, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970), the district court
found that a refusal of an application for public housing because of failure to satisfy
a two year city residency requirement constituted a very real inhibition upon the con-
stitutionally protected right to travel and could not be used to fence people out of the
city.
48. King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971). Supporting a challenge to a requirement that a
family reside in the city for five years prior to application for admission to a low in-
come housing project, a federal court stated that the right to travel is derived from
constitutional concepts of personal liberty so it "does not depend on the interstate na-
ture of the travel . . . but encompasses movement within a state as well." Id. at 648.
49. 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915).
50. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
51. Id. at 173.
52. Id. at 181 (Douglas, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 178 (Douglas, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 182-83 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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In 1966,r" the Supreme Court further broadened the scope of
the right to travel, extending its coverage to actions by individuals as
well as government, stating,
[ilt is important to reiterate that the right to travel freely from State
to State finds constitutional protection that is quite independent
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
56
The Court made no attempt to pinpoint the origin of the right to free
travel, stating that it is a basic human right generally protected by
the Constitution as a whole and repeatedly affirmed by the Court in
the past. The Court seemed anxious to end the debate over the origin
of the right to travel, thus avoiding artificial distinctions among the
different forms of travel. 57
Proponents of the moratorium may argue that Santa Barbara's
situation is so drastic that it should be allowed to restrict migration
since its action has a negligible effect on national travel. The primary
objection to their argument is that reduction of housing starts in any
community has national repercussions. An analogy can be drawn to
the 1942 case of Wickard v. Filburn,58 in which the Court voiced its
concern over restrictions on interstate commerce. The justices
declared a wheat farmer's crop, grown solely for the use of his family,
to be the proper subject of restrictions imposed for regulation of inter-
state commerce. Though his crop was trivial in itself, "his contribu-
tion, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far
from trivial."50
"Compelling State Interest".Requirement
Under the old "strict scrutiny" standard applied by the Court
when a fundamental right is involved, a government action limiting
migration and settlement will be upheld only if it can be shown to
protect a "compelling and substantial government interest." Once it
is determined that a burden has been placed upon a constitu-
tional right, "the onus of demonstrating that no less intrusive means
will adequately protect compelling state interests is upon the par-
ty seeking to justify the burden." 0 The modern test (suggested in
Roe v. Wade"1) would balance the importance of the commu-
nity's compelling interest against that of the individual interest it al-
55. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
56. Id. at 760 n.17.
57. Id. at 759.
58. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
59. Id. at 127-28. Accord, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123 (1941).
60. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting and con-
curring) (dealing with the power of states to regulate voting).
61. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See text accompanying notes 37-40 supra.
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legedly abridges.62  If Santa Barbara's moratorium is to stand against
constitutional attack, its proponents must affirmatively show that pro-
tection of the environment and the obligation to supply water to pres-
ent residents comprise a compelling interest which will prevail when
balanced against potential residents' right to settle in the area. If,
however, the Court revives its old "strict scrutiny-compelling interest!'
standard, its proponents additionally will be required to show that the
municipality has reasonable access to "no less intrusive means"63 of
accomplishing its objective.
Considering its present water supply only, the municipality should
be able to show that its obligations to present consumers, both resi-
dential and agricultural, fulfill the compelling interest requirement;
for extension of its water to the use of newcomers would result in
a shortage during summer months. In normal years, such a shortage
would simply require mandatory water rationing for four or five
months of the year. In years of light rainfall, however, the situation
would be grim; there would be insufficient water for the heavy agri-
cultural demands, with orchards and livestock dry and residential and
commercial water use reduced to bare necessity only. The community
which now seems a paradise to its residents could well turn into a
wasteland similar to that of the 1860's when the land became essentially
useless for a period of over five years.
Although the general rule applied by the courts to public utilities
is that a public utility must serve on reasonable terms all those who
desire the service it renders, 64 and may not arbitrarily discrimi-
nate against members of the public, 5 discrimination as to service may
be based upon a reasonable classification.66 The right of inhabitants
of a municipality to compel extension of service to them is not an
absolute and unqualified right; it is based to a large extent on the rea-
sonableness of the demand. 67 Because a public utility may not dis-
62. See text accompanying notes 25-41 supra for discussion of the Supreme
Court's new technique for handling equal protection cases. The Court's 1973-74 Term
has been conspicuously lacking in references to equal protection. E.g., Lau v. Nichols,
94 S. Ct. 786 (1974) (the Court focused on the violation of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, ignoring the equal protection challenge); North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 407 (1973) (the due process rational relation
test applied instead of equal protection).
63. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238 (1970).
64. United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm., 278 U.S. 300, 309 (1929).
65. Elk Run Tel. Co. v. General Tel. Co., 160 N.W.2d 311, 314 (1968).
66. Bilton Mach. Tool Co. v. United Illuminating Co., 110 Conn. 417, 426, 148
A. 337, 340 (1930).
67. Lukrawa v. Spring Valley Water Co., 169 Cal. 318, 332-33, 146 P. 640, 646
(1915). Factors which enter into the determination of the reasonableness of a demand
for an extension of service include the need and cost of the requested extension, and
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continue service to consumers, knowing they are dependent on the
service,08 a refusal to extend service to new customers would seem
reasonably justified when the resource demanded becomes limited.
When there is barely enough water, to service present users, refusal
to inconvenience them by adding additional burdens to the water
system surely cannot be termed arbitrary and discriminatory.
Taking into consideration only the present water available to the
Santa Barbara area, there seems to be a sufficient basis for the re-
fusal to allow any further water hookups. Weighed against non-resi-
dents' right to settle in the area, the community's interest appears the
more substantial.
Use of the available water supply is not, however, the sole path
open to the community. Santa Barbara County has access to leased
water from the Feather River Project which has been adopted by sev-
eral California counties. 9 Absent the desire on the part of Santa Bar-
bara citizens to inaugurate this project,7" a court must determine
whether the community's legislative body, which has weighed ecologi-
cal considerations against the economic advantages of further growth,
may be forced to adopt an expensive and limited program to allow
for unwanted expansion in population. 71 The court must balance non-
residents' right to travel against residents' right to preserve the
integrity of their environment.
Right To Preserve Environmental Quality-
The Challenge Answered
The environmental impact of further growth is of particular im-
portance to the Santa Barbara area. The mountains to the north and
ocean to the south prevent development in two directions, forcing an
east-west sprawl potentially on a par with that existing in the Los An-
the advantage to the public to be derived from it. Cedar Island Improvement Ass'n
v. Clinton Elec. L. & P. Co., 142 Conn. 359, 365, 114 A.2d 535, 538 (1955).
68. Sawyer v. City of San Diego, 138 Cal. App. 2d 652, 657, 292 P.2d 233, 239
(1956).
69. The project pipeline presently ends in Northern San Luis Obispo County, a
substantial distance north of the Goleta County Water District boundary. SANTA
BARBARA COUNTY WATER AGENCY, INVESTIGATION OF STATE WATER RESOURCES DEVEL-
OPMENT SYSTEM AS A SOURcE OF SUPPLEMENTAL WATER FOR SANTA BARBARA COUNTY
100 (1961) [hereinafter cited as INvESnGATION].
70. Since the 1972 moratorium, the citizens of the Santa Barbara area have re-
fused to approve water importation by ballot and observers predict they will renew their
refusal in 1974.
71. The term "limited" is appropriate here because Santa Barbara County has
contracted for a set amount of water per year from the project. It may not obtain
a larger allocation unless another participating county agrees to sell part of its allot-
ment. LEEDS, HELL & JEwrrT, supra note 11 at IV-3.
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geles Basin. Extension of the population over a long, narrow area
makes the job of supplying all public services doubly difficult and ex-
pensive. The mountain range traps any existing smog, intensifying
its effect. The area traditionally has been argicultural; the mild cli-
mate is ideal for production of a large variety of citrus fruit, as well
as avocados and year-round lettuce. The total loss of these orchards
and fields to housing developments not only would deprive the area
of its semi-rural atmosphere, but would exert a significant influence
on the supply of this produce to Southern California consumers.
Recognition that environment plays an important part in a munic-
ipality's land use planning is not new. In 1926, the United States
Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, Inc.,7 2 de-
clared that a community may dictate the speed and pattern of its
growth, though unfettered growth in the past had been permitted
or even welcomed. At the time of this case, the Village of Euclid
adjoined Cleveland and was practically a suburb of that city, though
the greater part of the municipal area was comprised of farm lands
and unimproved acreage. The village inaugurated a comprehensive
zoning plan which substantially interfered with appellee's use of the
large tract of land he owned within the municipal boundaries."3 Re-
garding the village's ordinance as within the general scope of munici-
pal power and a valid exercise of its authority, the Court upheld the
validity of the ordinance with the following statement:
Regulations, the wisdom, necessity, and validity of which, as ap-
plied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now
uniformly sustained. . . [which] half a century ago probably would
have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive . . . . And in this
there is no inconsistency, for while the meaning of constitutional
guarantees never varies, the scope of their application must expand
or contract to meet 'the new and different conditions which are con-
stantly coming within the field of their operation.
74
Official interest in ecological preservation has grown markedly in re-
cent years. On the federal level, Congress has commanded federal
and local governments to study carefully the environmental impact of
any programs they adopt before proceeding, and to begin an affirma-
tive action policy to
attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment with-
out degradation, risk to health or safety . . . ; [and] achieve a
balance between population and resource use which will permit
high standards of living and wide sharing of life's amenities. 75
72. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
73. Id. at 379-83.
74. Id. at 387.
75. National Environmental Policy Act., 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(3), (5) (1970).
More recently, Congress passed the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C.
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On the state level, the people of California with a 1972 referendum
approved the Coastline Initiative to preserve the California coastline
and areas contiguous to it from further damage.76
Recognizing the popular concern over increasing population over-
shadowing the necessity for clean, well-balanced ecological surround-
ings, courts have increasingly found environmental considerations rele-
vant to upholding a municipality's land use restrictions. Proper plan-
ning of land use and population concentration is a natural extension
of the traditional goals of police power and eminent domain power
to promote the public health, safety, and welfare.77 Consequently,
the scope of the police power has broadened considerably over the
years without judicial interference except in extreme cases of abuse
of the power. In Berman v. Parker,75 for example, the United States
Supreme Court stated:
The concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive . . . . The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as
§§ 1451-64 (Supp. 1973), in recognition of the need for maintaining the natural virtues
of coastal zones.
76. Known officially as the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972,
the law now comprises CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 27000-650 (West Supp. 1974). The
statute defines the coastal zone and outlines criteria for a statewide plan intended to
preserve the coastal ecosystem for the present and future enjoyment of the public. The
stated objective of the California Coastal Zone Conservation Plan are: 1) the overall
quality of the coastal zone environment will be maintained, restored, and enhanced
(Id., § 27302(a)); 2) all species of living organisms will continue to exist (Id.,
§ 27302(b) ); 3) an orderly, balanced utilization and preservation of coastal zone re-
sources will be maintained (Id., § 27302(c) ); 4) irreversible, irretrievable commit-
ments of coastal zone resources will be avoided (Id. § 27302(d) ). For a further out-
line of the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972 and the Federal Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1972, see Note, Saving the Seashore: Management Planning
for the Coastal Zone, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 191 (1973).
77. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). In Confederacion de la Raza Unida
v. City of Morgan Hill, 324 F. Supp. 895, 897-98 (N.D. Cal. 1971), a federal court
recognized the authority of the municipality to conduct urban planning, including pres-
ervation of natural amenities of the urban landscape. The court noted the growing
use of green belts, scenic easements, and planned unit developments as a means for
accomplishing these goals. Stating that such matters are the province of the local com-
munity involved, the court was loathe to interfere with the judgment of the local au-
thorities except in the most extreme cases. The court in Steel Hill Dev., Inc., v. Town
of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972), extended the municipality's duty to pro-
mote public health, safety, and general welfare under its police power to prevention
of proposed large scale development that would "have an irreversible effect on the
area's ecological balance, destroy scenic values, decrease open space, significantly
change the rural character of this small town, [and] pose substantial financial burdens
on the town for police, fire, sewer, and road service." Id. at 961. Feeling uncertain
as to how to attain the right balance between ecological and population pressures, the
court allowed the statute to stand as a "legitimate stop-gap measure." Id. at 962. Cf.
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, Inc., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
78. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as care-
fully patrolled. 79
More recently, a New York court in Nattin Realty, Inc. v. Lude-
wig"0 defined in clear terms the necessity of considering the factor
of ecology as a criterion in reviewing municipal legislation:
Respecting ecology as a new factor, it appears that the time has
come-if, indeed, it has not already irretrievably passed-for the
courts . . . to take "ecological notice" in zoning matters ....
[Municipal regulations] prompted by such environmental consider-
erations may appreciably limit the uses and profitability of land;
yet if both factors were to be placed upon the scales, the pro
bono publico considerations must prevail.81
Other state courts, including those of Wisconsin, Minnesota, Ore-
gon, and New Jersey, have gone so far as to declare preservation of
the quality of a community or neighborhood, to protect property values
or scenic beauty, to be a valid basis for exercise of the municipality's
police power.82  The rationale of these courts is a logical extension
of the traditional legal philosophy that a private land owner's use of
his or her property must be subordinate to the interests of the public
79. Id. at 33.
80. 67 Misc. 2d 828, 324 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
81. Id. at 832, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 672.
82. State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.
2d 217 (1955) extended municipal police power to promoting public convenience and
general prosperity, as well as public health, morals, or safety. Protection of property
values in a neighborhood was included in the former categories and regarded as a legiti-
mate objective of a municipal ordinance. In State ex reL Berry v. Houghton, 164
Minn. 146, 150, 204 N.W. 569, 570 (1925), aff'd, 273 U.S. 671 (1927), the Minnesota
court noted that, "The police power, in its nature indefinable, and quickly responsive,
in the interest of common welfare, to changing conditions, authorizes various restric-
tions upon the use of private property as social and economic changes come. A re-
striction, which years ago would have been intolerable . . . is accepted now without
a thought that it [unconstitutionally] invades a private [property] right. As social
relations become more complex restrictions on individual rights become more common."
To the question of "whether a city can wholly exclude a use of property on the ground
that the use is offensive to aesthetic sensibilities," the court answered, "yes," in Oregon
City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 43, 400 P.2d 255, 262 (1965). Upholding a minimum
lot zoning, the court in Fischer v. Bedminster Township, 11 N.J. 194, 205, 93 A.2d
378, 384 (1952), stated, "there would appear to be ample justification for the ordinance
in preserving the character of the community, maintaining the value of property therein
and devoting the land throughout the township for its most appropriate use." The "po-
lice power" mentioned in the text refers to the authority of federal, state, and local
government to impose regulations on, or seize by means of eminent domain (using due
process and, in the case of seizure, with just compensation to the owner), private prop-
erty if such action is taken in reasonable furtherance of public health, safety, and gen-
eral welfare.
[Vol. 1
as a whole.8 3 The issue becomes whether this philosophy can be ex-
tended to the situation in the Santa Barbara area in support of the com-
munity's decision to restrict permanently presently undeveloped areas
to their traditional agricultural use by refusing to furnish water for
residential, commercial, or industrial development.
Compliance with the contention of opponents of the water mora-
torium that further development should be allowed despite the area's
geographical inability to handle additional growth appears unwise if
the advice extended by various environmental study commissions is
heeded. In 1971, the California Environmental Quality Study Council
reported that
[w]e simply have to slow down our growth and stabilize the
population of our regions according to their carrying capacities.
This may be hard to accomplish, for growth has served us well in
this country since its beginnings. But the harsh reality is that un-
restrained growth and environmental quality have become incompat-
ible.8
4
Some environmental scholars insist that each community and geo-
graphical area has a different capacity for growth and that eventually
a community must be allowed to prevent its own destruction by halt-
ing development, thereby balancing available resources, both land and
water, with population growth.8,5 As a coastal community, Santa Bar-
bara has an additional burden; for its ecosystem is particularly sensi-
tive to imbalance and destruction. California citizens by referendum
in 1972 expressed their concern that the unique and fragile beauty
of coastal areas be preserved. 6 Their mandate makes Santa Barbara's
responsbility as a coastal community clear and pressing.
The Santa Barbara area has developed rapidly over the last ten
years, some observers might say too rapidly. If the water shortage
had been fully recognized in time, development could have been
slowed years ago to avoid the need for this abrupt halt. Area resi-
dents and their municipal officials, enamored with the prosperity ac-
companying growth, failed to recognize the danger until two succes-
83. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v. Schoene,
276 U.S. 272 (1927); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Barrick Realty, Inc.
v. City of Gary, 354 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Ind. 1973).
84. Lamm & Davison, supra note 5, at 3.
85. "If we are to live in harmony with that which has been given to us from
preceding generations and from the earth before man, we must make certain assump-
tions with respect to every available piece of land in the United States: each is in-
trinsically suitable for certain uses. . . . Any area is vulnerable to serious, permanent
and irreparable damage if development ignores naturally imposed environmental con-
straints. Any law regulating the use of land must include protection of natural re-
sources as an element of human welfare." V. YANNACON , JR., B. COHEN, & S. DAvI-
SON, 2 EvmorO~mTAL RIGHTS AND REMEmES 556 (1971) [hereinafter cited as YANNA-
CONE, COHEN & DAviSON]. See also, Lamm & Davison, supra note 5.
86. CAL. PuB. Rs. CODE §§ 27000 et seq. (West Supp. 1974).
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sive years of light rainfall caused the reservoir to drop drastically
enough to frighten even the most adamant supportef of the growth
which brought wealth to the community. The consequent emergency
required immediate action-the moratorium seemed the only course
open to the thirsty community. The issue of whether the moratorium
should stand, thus stopping growth in an area which could quickly out-
grow its water resources, can be resolved by looking to prior cases
of growth limitation.
California courts have demonstrated a policy of allowing munici-
palities to limit growth in certain areas which are unable to support
the burden imposed by concentrated use, though they have never ex-
tended this reasoning to the closing of an entire community. One
of the most recent cases of limited growth restriction Is Confederacion
de la Raza Unida v. City of Morgan Hilly7 The city of Morgan Hill,
California, adopted a zoning ordinance intended to regulate and re-
strict housing density in certain hilly areas. The cit. recognized the
inherent geological instability of the areas affected and imposed the
restrictions to preserve the physical and aesthetic character of the foot-
hills. 8 Plaintiffs challenged on the grounds of racial discrimination
the refusal to grant a variance for low cost, multi-unit housing on a
tract in the area restricted by the ordinance.80 Noting its reluctance
to interfere with the judgment of local authorities, the court rejected
plaintiffs' allegation of racial discrimination and upheld the ordinance,
allowing aesthetic considerations as a valid basis for the restriction of
growth in areas peculiarly sensitive to physical or aesthetic damage. 0
In 1971, Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc.
challenged the constitutionality of a statute authorizing cities and coun-
ties to require dedication of land or payment of fees as a condition
of approval of a subdivision plan, and of a Walnut Creek ordinance
thereunder.' 1 The California Supreme Court upheld the statute and
the ordinance, stating that total city needs are a proper consideration
in imposing land use regulations, in addition to the rational connec-
tion of the regulations to the proposed subdivision.2
87. 324 F. Supp. 895 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
88. Id. at 896.
89. Id. at 896-97.
90. Id. at 898.
91. Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut
Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971).
92. "A subscriber who . . ris] seeking to acquire the advantages of subdivision
* . . [has] the duty to comply with reasonable conditions for dedication so as to con-
form to the welfare of the . . . general public." Id. at 638, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal.
Rptr. at 634. Accord, Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949). See




If the courts will allow restriction of certain areas as in Morgan
Hill or in the case of municipalities which declare certain parcels of
land to be green belts, 93 a proponent of Santa Barbara's moratorium
may argue that in light of the obvious physical limitations imposed
on Santa Barbara by its geography, it is logical to extend this reasoning
to recognize the community's right to halt further burdens on its al-
ready overburdened land and water resources.94 A decision to allow
the moratorium to stand, thereby substantially eliminating migration
to the area, may be fiercely criticized by opponents of the moratorium.
The value of undeveloped property, locked into agricultural use by
the moratorium, would plummet while property values in developed
areas with access to sufficient water for residential, commercial, or
industrial use would climb markedly. To the owners of developed
property, such a result is highly desirable. The use of public wel-
fare as a rationale for actions with purely selfish motives is frequent
and a Pennsylvania court has remarked,
it must always be ascertained at the outset whether, in fact, it
is the public welfare which is being benefited or whether, dis-
guised as legislation for the public welfare ... [an] ordinance
actually serves purely private interests.9"
In even stronger terms, the same court rejected altogether population
growth controls by a community:
A zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the en-
trance of newcomers in order to avoid future burdens, economic
and otherwise, upon the administration of public services and facil-
ities cannot be held valid.
96
93. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 35009-09.1 (West 1968). California empowers cities
and counties to use zoning to regulate open space for recreation and use of natural
resources (Id. § 65850(a) (West Supp. 1974), amending (West 1966) ). Its cities and
counties are required to adopt local open space plans to provide for "comprehensive
and long range preservation and conservation of open space land within their jurisdic-
tion" (Id. § 65563 (West Supp. 1974), amending (West 1966) ), and such open space
plans must include specific implementing programs. General plans of local planning
agencies must consider open space requirements and provide for the conservation, de-
velopment, and utilization of natural resources (Id. § 65302(d)-(e) (West Supp. 1974),
amending (West 1966) ).
94. But see, Construction Indus. Ass'n v. Petaluma, Civil No. 73-663 (N.D. Cal.,
filed Apr. 24, 1973), in which real estate developers challenged the constitutionality
of parts of an official plan of the City of Petaluma (known as the "Petaluma Plan")
designed to limit urban growth. The stated purpose of the plan was to preserve the
city's small town character and its surrounding open space by setting the growth rate
at approximately 500 units per year, discouraging high density housing, and establishing
a greenbelt park on the eastern and northern edges of the city. Finding a substantial
infringement of the right to travel, a federal court has declared the "Petaluma Plan"
invalid. Appeal of the decision is probable.
95. National Land and Inv. Co. v. Easttown, 419 Pa. 504, 530, 215 A.2d 597,
611 (1965). Accord, Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970);
Girsch Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
96. National Land and Inv. Co. v. Easttown, 419 Pa. 504, 532, 215 A.2d 597,
612 (1965).
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A New York state court expressed similar concern that community
restrictions on building would limit the free mobility of nonresidents
but upheld a comprehensive community plan developed to significantly
limit the density of land use by the Town of Ramapo. "7 Pennsylvania
seems to stand alone in its rabid fear that individual municipalities,
if permitted to limit population growth to suit the capacity of the
land and resources, will eventually restrict individuals from moving at
all.
One significant federal case on the subject is Steel Hill Develop-
ment, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton.98 The court in Steel Hill warned
that "[w]here there is natural population growth it has to go some-
where, unwelcome as it may be, and in that case we do not think
it should be channelled by the happenstance of what town gets its
veto in first."9 9  Despite its reservations, the court did admit that a
municipality has an affirmative duty to promote public health, safety,
and general welfare, including the prevention of abnormal growth.
The town's refusal to permit the building of increasing numbers of sum-
mer and weekend homes because it would change the rural character
of the area, cause pollution of a nearby lake, and increase traffic and
air pollution was upheld. 10
The law dealing with land use and other growth controls is in
a state of change. One eastern state has rejected the concept that
a community might limit growth in the interest of promoting safe,
healthful, and aesthetically pleasing surroundings, 1' 1 despite the policy
announced by the National Environmental Policy Act, encouraging an
affirmative duty on the part of each municipality to do so. 102  Another
eastern state has voiced its concern that community growth limitation
necessary to preserve the environment will unconstitutionally restrict
travel, though the courts interpreting that state's laws seem unsure ex-
97. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138
(1972). Cf. Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424,
244 N.E.2d 700, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1969) (restrictions on land use may not perma-
nently prevent the reasonable use of private property for the only purposes to which
it is practically adapted, but the municipality may place restrictions on land use which
are reasonably related to an over-all general plan to promote the ultimate good of the
municipality as a whole).
98. 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972).
99. Id. at 962.
100. Id. at 960, 963.
101. National Land and Inv. Co. v. Easttown, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
"A zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers
in order to avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the administration of
public services and facilities cannot be held valid." Id. at 504, 215 A.2d at 612.
102. 42U.S.C. § 4331(b)(2) (1970).
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actly how to handle the problem.108 California courts have only gone
so far as to allow restriction of population density within certain areas
of a municipality, based on naturally imposed limitations. 0 4 The
probleMn is serious. Awareness of the ecological crisis cannot help
but prompt strong sympathy for the community which, blessed with
an idyllic environment, suddenly awakens to the threat of destruction
or damage to the ecological balance that continuing population growth
must inevitably cause. No wonder the people of Santa Barbara are
uneasy when, remembering that only ten years ago they enjoyed the
delights of a small town set on a warm, clean coastline, they now see
their paradise disintegrating before them simply because the demands
on the area are becoming too great. Los Angeles and its unbreath-
able air, dying trees, and congested freeways, lies only one hundred
miles to the south, a grim reminder to all Santa Barbarans of what their
community will surely become if accelerating growth held at bay by
the moratorium is resumed.
Viewed from another angle, the water moratorium effectively re-
duces the opportunity for new housing in the area nearly to zero, there-
by substantially interfering with the right of outsiders to travel to and
settle in the community. On a balance with the right to travel, the
judicial history of environmental rights is short and its origin in the
Constitution vague. The Ninth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution reserves to the people additional rights unnamed in the in-
strument itself.'0 5 Some legal scholars have suggested that it is in the
Ninth Amendment that we should seek support for environmental
rights.10 6  Whatever its pedigree, American courts and legislatures
show increasing respect for environmental quality and the individual
citizen's right to a pleasant and healthy environment.
Injunctive Relief
The form of relief sought by challengers of the Santa Barbara
moratorium has an impact on the case. A prohibitory injunction or-
ders cessation of a harmful action; a mandatory injunction orders com-
mencement of an affirmative action.10 7  Since the object of the suit
103. Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbormton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972).
104. Confederacion de la Raza Unida v. City of Morgan Hill, 324 F. Supp. 895
(N.D. Cal. 1971). Cf. Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v.
City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971).
105. 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
106. 1 YA1NNACONE, COHEN & DAviDSON, supra note 85, at 65-81; citing, Colorado
Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Case, 151 Colo. 235, 380 P.2d 34 (1962); 2 YANNA-
CONE, COHEN & DAVISON, supra note 85, at 267.
107. W. DE FuNiAK, HANDaOOK OF MODERN EQUrry 15 (2d ed. 1956).
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would be to compel the municipality to offer to new developments
continuing water service, a mandatory injunction is necessary. Courts
have long followed the doctrine that injunctions ought not be granted
unless absolutely necessary for the protection of constitutional rights.108
Courts are even more reluctant to grant injunctive relief where the
action of a governmental agency acting within the scope of its authority
is involved,10 9 particularly if the injunction would necessitate a munici-
pality's appropriation of tax -funds or imposition of obligations on the
government to use its resources in a particular affirmative manner."10
Compliance with the injunction would force the city to immedi-
ately seek new water resources to fill the needs of potential resi-
dents.11' Several solutions have been suggested, the most practical
of which is the Feather River Project mentioned earlier." 2  Con-
struction of necessary pipelines and other facilities for carrying, treat-
108. E.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908).
109. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
110. Barnes v. Gadsden, 174 F. Supp. 64 (D. Ala. 1958).
111. Res. 714, Goleta County Water Dist. Bd. of Directors kDec. 7, 1972), pre-
sented the following statistics:
Acre Feet
Total Ground Water 200,000
Safe Use 50,000
Total Available
Water (annually) 16,531 (5800 safe yield from ground water plus
10,731 allocation from Cachuma Proj-
ect)
Present Demand 17,800
Overdraft, i.e., dipping into the ground water at a rate greater than the safe yield
(amount replaced by rainfall, seepage, etc.) can be done safely over a period of time
to a maximum of 50,000 acre feet. LEEDS, HILL & JEwrrr, INc., GOLETA CoUTmY
WATER DIST. WATER MGMT. PROGRAM PHASE I 21 (Apr. 19, 1969), warned that there
was no available information to indicate whether or not deep-seated brines and other
minerals might intrude into the ground water body if the levels were reduced further
by overdraft. Limited overdraft to fill needs of present residents in years when demand
exceeds available water likely would not exceed the 50,000 acre feet safe use level,
but demands of additional residents would certainly do so. The district set the annual
increase in demand (prior to the moratorium) at 850 acre feet per year.
112. The Feather River Project, officially known as "The State Water Resources De-
velopment System," was authorized by the California legislature in 1959 and by the
voters in the 1960 general election, CAL. WATER CODE § 11260 (West 1967). The
authorized facilities consist of storage works in Northern California and an aqueduct
system to convey surplus Northern California water southward to service areas in the
San Joaquin Valley, Central Coastal area, and Southern California. The aqueduct sys-
tem is to eventually include a coastal aqueduct leading from the main aqueduct into
the San Joaquin Valley, westward into San Luis Obispo County, and southward to
Santa Barbara County, enabling delivery of the imported water to those two counties
as well as to a portion of the Antelope Plain area in Kern County. INvESGATON,
supra note 69 at 100.
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ing, and distributing the water will necessarily cost area taxpayers a
great deal of money and the first drop of water from the project could
not reach Santa Barbara for five years or more. 113  Because the water
obtained from the project is a set allocation, 1 4 any forcing of residents
of the Goleta County Water District to institute the project will not
alter the situation substantially; it will delay solution of the water short-
age to a later date. When the area's needs consume additional water
provided by the project, another moratorium must be declared; for
the community's only reserve tank will be empty. Area residents have
refused this alternative,"' possibly because of the expense, possibly
because it postpones the problem instead of solving it. Will a court
consider area residents' desire to preserve their environment suffi-
ciently compelling, when balanced against nonresidents' -ight to travel,
to justify a permanent interference with population growth?
Conclusion
Santa Barbara has become a battle ground for two formidable
opponents: the well-established right to travel meets head-on with
a young, but increasingly strong contender, the right to a balanced
ecology. There is no longer room for compromise; for the crowd has
gathered and the bell sounded. A wise court must act as referee in
determining which will prevail.
A look to the recent trend in the United States Supreme Court's
handling of equal protection cases may provide a preview of the prop-
er procedure for the heavyweight bout. As the two contenders don
their gloves, the court will likely set in place its scale of justice and
stack on each balance the merits of the conflicting interests."0
The right to free travel has substantial judicial standing. The
right to environmental quality and ecological balance is relatively new
and regarded by some as desirable but not altogether essential. This
spectator concludes that a court will hold the moratorium unconstitu-
113. LEEDs, HEL & JEWrrT, supra note 11 at IV-3.
114. The allocation for the entire county, including five water districts, is per year
1200 acre feet in Year 1, increasing to 10,900 acre feet by Year 5, and further increas-
ing to the maximum of 57,700 acre feet in Year 11. The contract allows for some
flexibility in the delivery schedule, but provides for no stretching of the maximum.
The allocation must be equitably divided among the five districts, all of which have
similar growth difficulties. Id.
115. Goleta County Water Dist. Bd. of Directors, Minutes of Nov. 30, 1972 at
3. Public support was voiced in favor of water rationing when necessary, termination
of new hookup permits, and requirement of public approval of any supplemental water
supplies. The Responsible Water Policy Ordinance was instituted as of May 15, 1973,
by voter referendum. It formally established as public policy the community sentiment.
116. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See also, Gunther, supra note 29,
at 18-37.
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tional and compel the municipality to obtain sufficient water elsewhere
to service future building. It is hard for even the most forward-looking
court to realize that the time must come when water and other natural
resources will no longer be plentiful. A stubborn faith in the ability
of our technological and scientific expertise to bail us out of trouble
supports the assumption that by the time the water purchased through
the Feather River lease is consumed, Santa Barbara and other com-
munities similarly situated will have access to an alternative water sup-
ply. Recent experience with the shortage of fossil fuels should awak-
en an awareness that no natural resource is unlimited and that we must
adjust our lives, even giving up important conveniences and "necessi-
ties," to adapt to available supplies.
Perhaps this heavyweight match will be rescheduled for the date
when the Santa Barbara area's water supply, including imported wa-
ter, has been committed totally. In the interim, the people of the
county must inaugurate a strict plan for intelligent land use. Such
a plan should allow for an even balance of residential, commerical,
industrial, and recreational use and avoid reaching the second crisis
stage where there is, finally, no room for additional water consumers.
The only true solution to the problem lies in a program sponsored
by the state government to distribute the total state population density
evenly throughout the state, allowing for lighter density in areas like
Santa Barbara which cannot support heavy building.117  Humankind
has been given a unique opportunity to choose whether the species
will drown in its own sewage, be buried in its own garbage, choke to
death on air it cannot breathe, or be driven to homicide or suicide
by the noise surrounding it."" The time has come when the state
government must take the situation in hand and, in cooperation with
other states and the federal government, prevent the uneven popula-
tion distribution which causes high density in some areas which cannot
tolerate it and density in other areas far below their capacities.
Land use planning on a state and national level is vital. A care-
fully balanced mixture of land use techniques and powers can often
balance private economic interests and the public benefit. The state
can influence zoning patterns to discourage the kind of development
117. "Conflicts among the rights of an individual landowner, his neighbors, and
the community should be resolved by the unit of government best able to take into
account broad regional interests. Urban growth has outstripped the ability of small
government units to handle environmental decisions that have metropolitan, regional,
or even state-wide impact. . . . Americans are recognizing the need to examine care-
fully what government can do to assure that land is treated as a resource to be man-
aged and not merely as a commodity to be marketed." GRAD, supra note 8 at 8-10.
118. See, 1 YANNACONE, COHEN & DAvisON, supra note 85, at 1-3; GRAD, supra note
8, at 1-6-1-7.
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that over-taxes the local environment or costs more in municipal
spending that it will pay in property taxes. Subdivision controls can
permit cluster development and require open space preservation.
Exercise of the power of eminent domain by federal, state, and
local government to purchase land in scenic areas like Santa Barbara
can allow for preservation of the land in its natural state for controlled
use by the public.
A final incentive for preservation of open space in areas which
will not tolerate heavy population concentration includes a variety of
state and federal tax benefits. Low property taxes can be extended
to landowners whose property is desirable for development (and thus
normally taxed heavily) to take pressure off them to sell the land if
they contract to hold the land in its natural or agricultural state for
a given number of years. Gifts of desirable land to the public should
be assessed liberally when determining their value for income tax de-
duction purposes.
A number of states have state planning commissions for deter-
mining the best use of land throughout the state.'1 9 Such a plan could
be adopted on a national scale. A nationwide land use plan would
place some burden on free travel, but it would be a burden shared
by all Americans equally. Thus, there would be no denial of equal
protection. All would be equally free and equally burdened in exer-
cising their right to travel.
119. See, e.g., HAwAII REV. STAT. § 205-2 et seq. (1968 Supp. 1970), which divides
all lands in the state into four categories: urban, rural, agricultural, and conservation.
See generally GRAD, supra note 8, at 8-1 et seq.
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